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Abstract: The random oracle model (ROM) has been widely used for analyzing cryp-
tographic schemes. In the real world, a quantum adversary equipped with a quantum
computer can execute hash functions on an arbitrary superposition of inputs. Therefore,
one needs to analyze the post-quantum security in the quantum random oracle model
(QROM). Unfortunately, working in the QROM is quite difficult because many proof
techniques in the ROM have no analogue in the QROM. A technique that can help solve
this problem is the One-Way to Hiding (O2H) Theorem, which was first proven in 2015
by Unruh. In 2018, Ambainis, Hamburg and Unruh presented an improved version of
the O2H Theorem which uses so called semi-classical oracles and has higher flexibility
and tighter bounds. This improvement of the O2H Theorem should allow us to derive
better security bounds for most schemes that used the old version. We take one paper
that used the old version of the O2H Theorem to prove the security of different schemes
in the QROM and give new proofs using semi-classical oracles.
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Tihedamad postkvant turvalised krüpteerimisprotokollid poolklas-
sikaliste oraaklite abil
Lühikokkuvõte: Krüpteerimisprotokollide analüüsimiseks kasutatakse tihti juhusliku
oraakli mudelit (JOM), aga postkvant turvaliste protokollide analüüs tuleb läbi viia
kvant juhusliku oraakli mudelis (KJOM). Kuna paljudel tõestamise tehnikatel ei ole
kvant juhusliku oraakli mudelis analoogi, on KJOMis raske töötada. Seda probleemi
aitab lahendada One-Way to Hiding (O2H) Teoreem, mille Unruh tõestas 2015. aastal.
Ambainis, Hamburg ja Unruh esitasid teoreemi täiustatud versiooni 2018. aastal. See
kasutab poolklassikalisi oraakleid, millel on suurem paindlikkus ja tihedamad piirid.
Täiustatud versioon võimaldab tugevdada kõigi protokollide turvalisust, mis kasutasid
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3
1 Introduction
The random oracle model (ROM) has been widely used for analyzing cryptographic
schemes. In the random oracle model, instead of using a hash function H : M → N ,
we model the hash function as a uniformly randomly chosen function out of the space
of all functions from M to N . Generic constructions for an efficient IND-CCA-secure
KEM in the ROM have renewed interest in the post quantum setting. In the real world,
a quantum adversary equipped with a quantum computer can execute hash functions
on an arbitrary superposition of inputs [JZM19a]. Therefore, one needs to analyze the
post-quantum security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). In the quantum
random oracle model, quantum adversaries are given quantum access to the random
oracles and classical access to all other oracles. Unfortunately, working in the QROM
is quite difficult because many proof techniques in the ROM have no analogue in the
QROM [Bon+11].
A technique that can help solve this problem is One-Way to Hiding (O2H) Theo-
rem, which was first proven by Unruh [Unr15b]. Since the O2H Theorem gives a generic
reduction from a hiding-style property to a one-wayness-style property, the Theorem
was used in many security proofs after its first release. In 2018, Ambainis, Hamburg
and Unruh [AHU19] presented an improved version of the O2H Theorem which uses so
called semi-classical oracles (see subsection 3.2.1) and has higher flexibility and tighter
bounds.
The improvement of the O2H Theorem should allow us to derive better security
bounds for most schemes that used the old version. In addition to explaining the im-
proved version of the Theorem, Ambainis et al. [AHU19] showed the advantage gained
by the new version in a Quantum Security of the Fujisaki-Okamoto and OAEP Trans-
forms [TU16]. Similar security proof improvements were later made by Hövelmanns et
al. [HKSU18] and Jiang et al. [JZM19a]. We take one more paper [HHK17] that used
the old version of the O2H Theorem to prove the security of different schemes in the
QROM and give new proofs using semi-classical oracles. We distinguish query number
and query depth and give proofs with different assumptions about the underlying public
key encryption scheme to get better bounds.
In the second section we give an overview of techniques and definitions that we
use. In the third section we introduce the original One-Way to Hiding Theorem, define
semi-classical oracles and show the improved version of the O2H Theorem. Subsec-
tion 3.3 focuses on the impact of the O2H Theorem to existing cryptosystems. In sec-
tion 4 we define three transformations and prove the security of these transformations
in the quantum random oracle model using the improved version of the O2H Theorem.
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2 Background
In this section we give an overview of techniques and definitions that we are going
to use. We expect the reader to have some knowledge of cryptography and quantum
computing. Since we work with theorems from different authors, we need to fix one
notion that we use throughout this thesis to not confuse the reader. For basics of quantum
computing, we refer to a standard textbook such as [NC00].
For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. For a set S, denote the cardinality of set S by
|S|. For a finite set S, we denote the sampling of a uniformly random element x by
x
$←− S and we denote the sampling according to some distribution D by x ← D. ByJBK we denote the bit that is 1 if the boolean statement B is true, and otherwise 0. For
a polynomial p(X), Roots(p) denotes the set of (complex) roots of p.
Algorithms. We denote the deterministic computation of an algorithm A on input x by
y := A(x) and the probabilistic computation by y ← A(x). We denote algorithms with
access to an oracle O by AO.
Quantum computing. A quantum accessible oracle O for a function f : X → Y is
modelled as a unitary transformation Uf operating on two registers: an input register
Q and an output register R (with space CX and CY respectively), where Uf : |q, r〉 7→
|q, r ⊕ f(x)〉. Here ⊕ is a involutive group operation like XOR for a set of bitstrings.
A quantum oracle algorithm can perform classical and quantum computations,
and query classical and/or quantum-accessible oracles. We allow an oracle algorithm A
to perform oracle queries in parallel. We say that A is a q-query algorithm if it performs
at most q oracle queries (counting parallel queries as separate queries), and has query
depth d if it invokes the oracle at most d times (counting parallel queries as one query).
For example, if A performs 4 parallel queries followed by 3 parallel queries, we have
q = 7 and d = 2.
2.1 Security
The notion of indistinguishability against chosen-cicphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is widely
known as the standard security notion for asymmetric encryption schemes. Intuitively,
IND-CCA security requires that no efficient adversary, who has access to decryption
oracle, can recognize which of the two messages was encrypted in a given ciphertext,
even if the adversary chooses the candidate messages himself. In a similar but weaker
notion of indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), adversary is
not given access to a decryption oracle. [HHK17]
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IND-CCA is usually the desired notion of security. Unfortunately, the security is
often much more difficult to prove than IND-CPA security for example. Thus, multiple
transformations have been suggested for turning a weaker public-key encryption (PKE)
scheme into an IND-CCA one. For example, Fujisaki and Okamoto [FO13] combined
a one-way (OW-CPA) secure asymmetric encryption scheme with a one-time secure
symmetric encryption scheme. OW-CPA security requires that no efficient adversary
can find the encrypted message based on only the ciphertext and public key. The result-
ing hybrid scheme was IND-CCA secure in the random oracle model (see below).
Okamoto and Pointcheval [OP01] and Coron et al. [Cor+02] also proposed two
more generic transformations that were considerably simpler. These however required
the underlying asymmetric scheme to be one-way against plaintext checking attacks
(OW-PCA), that is a non-standard security notion that provides the adversary with a
plaintext checking oracle Pco(c,m). Pco returns 1 if and only if decryption of cipher-
text c yields the original message m.
Although many generic transformations for reaching IND-CCA security (or some
other required security) have been proposed, using newer techniques may give tighter
security reductions. We call a security reduction non-tight in the random oracle model
if it loses a factor qG (the number of random oracle queries). For example, the security
reduction FO transformation in [FO13] is not tight and this results in considerably less
efficient schemes.
2.2 Random oracle model
In many cases, the security of cryptosystems that use hash functions is very difficult or
even impossible to prove based on simple assumptions about the hash function (such as
collision-resistance). Instead, we would like to use the fact that a hash function behaves
like a totally random function. This is called analyzing protocols in the Random Oracle
Model (ROM). So, instead of using a hash function H : M → N , we model the hash
function as a uniformly randomly chosen function out of the space of all functions from
M to N . This randomly chosen function is called a random oracle. Using a ROM as a
proof technique in a cryptographic setting was first introduced in [BR93].
Since many existing public-key systems are proven insecure in the quantum set-
ting, the interest in post-quantum secure cryptosystems has increased. Boneh et al.
[Bon+11] state that to prove post-quantum security one needs to prove security in the
quantum-accessible random oracle model (QROM). That is a model where the adver-
sary can query the random oracle with quantum state.
If the adversary has classical access to the random oracle, the adversary is given
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oracle access to a random hash function O : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and it can learn the
value O(x) only by querying the oracle O at the classical state x. However, in a con-
crete system, the random oracle is replaced with a concrete hash function. This enables
a quantum attacker to evaluate this hash function. Therefore, in the QROM, the adver-
sary is allowed to evaluate the random oracle “in superposition”. This means that the
adversary can submit quantum sates |ϕ〉 = ∑ |x, y〉 to the oracle O and receive the
evaluated state
∑ |x, y ⊕O(x)〉. This is called a quamtum(-accessible) random oracle
model. [Bon+11]
While quantum adversaries are given quantum access to the random oracles in-
volved, access to all other oracles (e.g., plaintext checking or decapsulation oracles)
remains classical [HHK17].
2.3 Public-key encryption
A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) consists of three algorithms
and a finite message spaceM. The message space could be infinite in general, but in we
consider only finite message spaces. The key generation algorithm Gen outputs a key
pair (pk, sk). The encryption algorithm Enc outputs an encryption c ← Enc(pk,m)
of m under the public key pk. The decryption algorithm Dec outputs either a message
m = Dec(sk, c) ∈ M or a special symbol ⊥ /∈ M to indicate that c is not a valid
ciphertext. [HHK17]
GAME COR
1 (pk, sk)← Gen
2 m← A(sk, pk)
3 c← Enc(pk,m)
4 return JDec(sk, c) 6= mK
GAME COR-RO
5 (pk, sk)← Gen
6 m← AG(sk, pk)
7 c← Enc(pk,m)
8 return JDec(sk, c) 6= mK
GAME COR-QRO
9 (pk, sk)← Gen
10 m← AH(sk, pk)
11 c← Enc(pk,m)
12 return JDec(sk, c) 6= mK
Figure 1: Correctness games COR for PKE in the standard model, COR-RO for PKE
defined relative to a random oracle G and COR-QRO for PKE defined relative to a
quantum random oracle H.
The δ-correctness of a public-key encryption scheme PKE means, that for all (pos-
sibly unbounded) adversaries A,
Pr[CORAPKE ⇒ 1 ] ≤ δ.
The correctness game COR is defined in Figure 1.
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If PKE is defined relative to a random oracle G, then the correctness bound might
depend on the number of queries to G. We call a public-key encryption scheme PKE
δ(gG)-correct in the random oracle model if for all (possibly unbounded) adversaries A,
making at most qG queries to the random oracle G,
Pr[CORAPKE ⇒ 1 ] ≤ δ(gG).
The correctness game COR-RO is defined in Figure 1.
Similarly, if PKE = PKEH is defined relative to a quantum random oracle H, then
the correctness bound might also depend on the number of queries to H. We call a
public-key encryption scheme PKE in the quantum random oracle model δ(gH)-correct
if for all (possibly unbounded) adversaries A, making at most qH queries to the quantum
random oracle H,
Pr[COR− QROAPKE ⇒ 1 ] ≤ δ(gH).
The correctness game COR-QRO is also defined in Figure 1. [HHK17]
Security. We also define security notions for public-key encryption. Definitions are
adapted from [HHK17].
First four security notions for public-key encryption are:
• OW-CPA stands for one-wayness under chosen plaintext attacks. OW-CPA secu-
rity requires that no efficient adversary can find the encrypted message based on
only the ciphertext and public key.
• OW-PCA stands for one-wayness under plaintext checking attacks. OW-PCA is a
non-standard security notion that provides the adversary with a plaintext checking
oracle Pco(c,m). Pco returns 1 if and only if decryption of ciphertext c yields
the original message m.
• OW-VA stands for one-wayness under validity checking attacks. OW-VA is a
non-standard security notion that provides the adversary with a validity checking
oracle Cvo(c). Cvo returns 1 if and only if decryption of ciphertext c yields a
valid message (that is m ∈M).
• OW-PCVA stands for one-wayness under plaintext and validity checking attacks.
OW-PCVA is a non-standard security notion that provides the adversary with both
a plaintext checking oracle Pco(c,m) and a validity checking oracle Cvo(c).
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GAME OW-ATK
1 (pk, sk)← Gen
2 m∗ ←M
3 c∗ ← Enc(pk,m)
4 m′ ← AOATK(pk, c∗)
5 return Pco(m′, c∗)
Pco(m ∈M, c)
6 return JDec(sk, c) = mK
Cvo(c 6= c∗)
7 m := Dec(sk, c)
8 return Jm ∈MK
Figure 2: Games OW-ATK for PKE, OATK is defined in Definition 2.1.
Definition 2.1. (OW-ATK for PKE). Let PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public-key
encryption scheme with message space M. For ATK ∈ {CPA,PCA,VA,PCVA}, we
define OW-ATK games as in Figure 2, where
OATK :=

− ATK = CPA
Pco(·, ·) ATK = PCA
Cvo(·) ATK = VA
Pco(·, ·),Cvo(·) ATK = PCVA
,
We define the OW-ATK advantage function of an adversary A against PKE as
AdvOW-ATKPKE (A) := Pr[OW-ATK
A
PKE ⇒ 1].
The next security notion is indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks
(IND-CPA). Intuitively, IND-CPA security requires that no efficient adversary can rec-
ognize which of the two messages was encrypted in a given ciphertext, even if the
adversary chooses the candidate messages himself.
GAME IND-CPA
1 (pk, sk)← Gen
2 b
$←− {0, 1}
3 (m∗0,m
∗
1, st)← A1(pk)
4 c∗ ← Enc(pk,m∗b)
5 b′ ← A2(pk, c∗, st)
6 return Jb′ = bK
GAME IND-CCA
7 (pk, sk)← Gen
8 b
$←− {0, 1}
9 (K∗0 , c
∗)← Encaps(pk)
10 K∗1
$←− K
11 b′ ← ADecaps(c∗,K∗b )
12 return Jb′ = bK
Decaps(c 6= c∗)
13 K := Decaps(sk, c)
14 return K
Figure 3: Games IND-CPA for PKE and IND-CCA for KEM.
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Definition 2.2. (IND-CPA for PKE). Let PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public-key
encryption scheme with message spaceM. We define IND-CPA game as in Figure 3,
and the IND-CPA advantage function of an adversary A = (A1, A2) against PKE (s.t.
A2 has binary output) as
AdvIND-CPAPKE (A) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[IND-CPAA ⇒ 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
It is well known that IND-CPA security of PKE (with sufficiently large message
space) implies its OW-CPA security. This is summarized in the following lemma from
[HHK17]:
Lemma 2.1. For any adversary B there exists and adcersary A with the same running
time as B such that
AdvOW-CPAPKE (B) ≤ AdvIND-CPAPKE (A) +
1
|M| .
2.4 Key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)
A key encapsulation mechanism is a probabilistic algorithm that produces a random
symmetric key and an asymmetric encryption of that key. KEMs are useful because
any IND-CCA secure KEM can be combined with any chosen-ciphertext secure sym-
metric encryption scheme to obtain a IND-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme
[CS98]. Since KEMs are efficient and versatile, in practice one often works with hybrid
encryption schemes derived from a KEM.
A key encapsulation mechanism KEM = (Gen,Encaps,Decaps) consists of
three algorithms. The key generation algorithmGen outputs a key pair (pk, sk), here pk
also defines the finite key space K. The encapsulation algorithm Encaps(pk) outputs a
tuple (K, c), where c is said to be the encapsulation of key K ∈ K. The deterministic
decapsulation algorithm Decaps(sk, c) outputs either a key K = Decaps(sk, c) ∈ K
or a special symbol ⊥ /∈ K to indicate that c is not a valid encapsulation. [HHK17]
The next security notion is indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attacks
(IND-CCA). Intuitively, IND-CCA security requires that no efficient adversary, who has
access to decryption oracle, can recognize which of the two messages was encrypted in
a given ciphertext, even if the adversary chooses the candidate messages himself.
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Definition 2.3. (IND-CCA for KEM). Let KEM = (Gen,Encaps,Decaps) be a key
encapsulation mechanism with key space K. We define IND-CCA game as in Figure 3,
and the IND-CCA advantage function of an adversary A against KEM as
AdvIND-CCAKEM (A) :=
∣∣∣∣Pr[IND-CCAA ⇒ 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
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3 One-Way to Hiding Theorem
The random oracle model has been widely used for analyzing cryptographic schemes.
Generic constructions for an efficient IND-CCA-secure KEM in the ROM like in [HHK17]
have renewed interest in the post quantum setting. In the real world, a quantum adver-
sary equipped with a quantum computer can execute hash functions on an arbitrary
superposition of inputs [JZM19a]. Therefore, one needs to analyze the post-quantum
security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM), first introduced by Boneh et al.
[Bon+11].
Unfortunately, working in the QROM is quite difficult because many proof tech-
niques in the ROM have no analogue in the QROM [Bon+11]. One example of such
technique is programming of the random oracle, where we run the adversary with ac-
cess to a random oracle but change the answer to certain queries during the execution.
Here, the proof goes through if the adversary does not notice the programming. This is
achieved by showing that the probability of changing a queried value is negligible. But
in the quantum setting the adversary could query the superposition of all inputs in the
first query. Now the proof would not go through because programming would change a
value that the adversary already queried.
A technique that can solve this problem is the One-Way to Hiding (O2H) The-
orem, which was first proven by Unruh [Unr15b]. Since the O2H Theorem gives a
generic reduction from a hiding-style property to a one-wayness-style property, the the-
orem was used in many security proofs after its first release. In 2018, Ambainis, Ham-
burg and Unruh [AHU19] presented an improved version of the O2H Theorem that has
higher flexibility and tighter bounds.
3.1 Original O2H Theorem
Unruh’s ”one-way to hiding“ (O2H) Theorem from [Unr15b] is used in most post-
quantum security analyses. The O2H Theorem was first used to prove that a timed-
release encryption that is (revocably) one-way can be transformed it into one that is
(revocably) hiding in the random oracle model [Unr15b]. The theorem was given as
follows:
Theorem 3.1 (One-way to hiding from [Unr15b]). Let H : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m be
a random oracle. Consider an algorithm A that makes at most q oracle queries. Let
BH(x) do the following: pick i $←− {1, . . . , q} and y $←− {0, 1}m, runAH(x, y) until (just
before) the i-th query, measure the argument of the query in the computational basis,
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output the outcome. Let
P 1A := Pr[b
′ = 1 : x← {0, 1}n, b′ ← AH(x,H(x))]
P 2A := Pr[b
′ = 1 : x← {0, 1}n, y ← {0, 1}m, b′ ← AH(x, y)]
PB := Pr[x = x
′ : x← {0, 1}n, x′ ← BH(x)]
(1)
Then |P 1A − P 2A| ≤ 2q
√
PB.
Here, |P 1A − P 2A| shows the probability that the adversary distinguishes between
the original oracle and the reprogrammed oracle. On the other hand, PB shows the
probability that the adversary guesses the location where the oracle was reprogrammed.
This type of game is often called ”guessing game“.
3.2 New approach
In 2018, Ambainis, Hamburg and Unruh [AHU19] presented an improved version of
the O2H Theorem. This improves the theorem in many aspects:
• Non-uniform random oracles. Instead of a uniformly random function, any
distribution of oracles is allowed.
• Multiple reprogrammed points. Instead of allowing to reprogram only a single
point, an entire set S of positions can be reprogrammed.
• Arbitrary joint distributions. The distribution of reprogrammed locations and
of the adversary’s input can be arbitrarily correlated with the distribution of the
random oracle.
• Tighter bounds. Theorem gives better bounds compared to the original one.
• Query depth. Theorem distinguishes between the number of queries q and query
depth d.
3.2.1 Semi-classical oracles
One major difference from the original O2H theorem is the use of ”semi-classical ora-
cles“. We know that quantum oracles do not measure their input or output, but classical
oracles measure everything. Semi-classical oracles [AHU19] are defined to only mea-
sure the input. Formally, a semi-classical oracle OSCf for a function f : X → Y is
queried with two registers: an input register Q and an output register R (with space CX
and CY respectively).
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When the oracle is queried with a value |x〉 in Q, the oracle performs a measure-
ment of f(x) and initializes the R register to |y〉 for the measured y. In the paper by
Ambainis et al. [AHU19], f is always the indicator function fS for a set S. This means:
fs(x) = 1 if x ∈ S and fs(x) = 0 if x /∈ S. Let us call a semi-classical oracle with this
index function OSCS .
Define event Find as follows: OSCS returns |1〉 during the execution of a quantum
algorithm AOSCS . This event is called Find because if it occurs during the execution, the
simulator could stop and measure the input register Q to ”find“ an element x ∈ S.
If H : X → Y is some other quantum-accessible oracle, H \ S (”H punctured
on S“) is defined as an oracle which on input x first queries OSCS (x) and then H(x).
It is called ”puncturing“ because when Find doesn’t occur, the outcome of AH\S is
independent of H(x) for all x ∈ S, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 (from [AHU19]). Let S ⊆ X be random. Let G,H : X → Y be random
functions satisfying ∀x /∈ S : G(x) = H(x). Let z be a random bitstring. (S,G,H, z
may have arbitrary joint distribution.)
Let A be a quantum oracle algorithm (not neccesarily unitary).
Let E be an arbitrary (classical) event.
Then
Pr[E ∧ ¬Find : x← AH\S(z)] = Pr[E ∧ ¬Find : x← AG\S(z)].
3.2.2 Semi-classical O2H Theorem
Semi-classical oracles allow us to split the original O2H Theorem into two parts. The
first part shows how much adversary’s behavior changes when a random oracle is punc-
tured on S:
Theorem 3.2 (Semi-classical O2H from [AHU19]). Let S ⊆ X be random. LetG,H :
X → Y be random functions satisfying ∀x /∈ S : G(x) = H(x). Let z be a random
bitstring. (S, G, H , z may have arbitrary joint distribution.)
Let A be an oracle algorithm of query depth d (not necessarily unitary).
Let
Pleft := Pr[b = 1 : b← AH(z)]
Pright := Pr[b = 1 : b← AG(z)]
Pfind := Pr[Find : A
G\S(z)] = Pr[Find : AH\S(z)]
(2)
Then
|Pleft−Pright | ≤ 2
√
(d+ 1) · Pfind and |
√
Pleft−
√
Pright | ≤ 2
√
(d+ 1) · Pfind .
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The theorem also holds with bound
√
(d+ 1) · Pfind for the following alternative
definitions of Pright:
Pright := Pr[b = 1 : b← AH\S(z)] (3)
Pright := Pr[b = 1 ∧ ¬Find : b← AH\S(z)] (4)
Pright := Pr[b = 1 ∧ ¬Find : b← AG\S(z)] (5)
Pright := Pr[b = 1 ∧ Find : b← AH\S(z)] (6)
Pright := Pr[b = 1 ∧ Find : b← AG\S(z)] (7)
In Theorem 3.2, A is given access to a single oracle (G or H). In many cases
(Theorem 4.2 for example), A must have access to additional oracles. In that case,
additional oracles can just be encoded as part of z. The Theorem still holds because
there were no assumptions on the runtime of A, the size of z or the number of queries
to additional oracles. The proof of Theorem 3.2 is given in [AHU19].
The second part of O2H Theorem relates the probability of event Find to the guess-
ing probability:
Theorem 3.3 (Search in semi-classical oracle from [AHU19]). LetA be any quantum
oracle algorithm making at most q queries to a semi-classical oracle with domain X .
Let S ⊆ X and z ∈ {0, 1}∗ . (S, z may have arbitrary joint distribution.)
LetB be an algorithm that on input z chooses i $←− {1, . . . , d}; runsAOSC∅ (z) until
(just before) the i-th query; then measures all query input registers in the computational
basis and outputs the set T of measurement outcomes.
Then
Pr[Find : AO
SC
S (z)] ≤ 4d · Pr[S ∩ T 6= ∅ : T ← B(z)]. (8)
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is also given in [AHU19]. The next Corollary shows
what happens in the common case that the input of A is independent of S:
Corollary 3.1 (from [AHU19]). Suppose that S and z are independent and that A is a
q-query algorithm. Let Pmax := maxx∈X Pr[x ∈ S]. Then
Pr[Find : AO
SC
S (z)] ≤ 4q · Pmax. (9)
For uniform x ∈ {1, . . . , N}, AOSC{x} finds x with probability less than 4·q
N
.
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3.3 Impact
After the first release of the O2H Theorem [Unr15b], Unruh gave two more variants
of the Theorem. In a paper called Quantum position verification in the random ora-
cle model [Unr14] Unruh introduced an adaptive version, which allows to reprogram
the random oracle at a location that is influenced by the adversary. This was used for
analyzing a quantum verification protocol. The third variant of the O2H Theorem pub-
lished in Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the quantum random oracle model
[Unr15a] was even more adaptive and was used for the design of non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof systems.
The Theorem was also widely used by other authors. Here, we give a list of papers
with authors that used one of the three variants of the O2H Theorem in security proofs:
• Mayuresh Vivekanand Anand, Ehsan Ebrahimi Targhi, Gelo Noel Tabia, Do-
minique Unruh. Post-quantum Security of the CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR, and XTS
Modes of Operation [ATTU16]
• Ehsan Ebrahimi Targhi, Dominique Unruh. Quantum Security of the Fujisaki-
Okamoto and OAEP Transforms [TU16].
• Melissa Chase, David Derler, Steven Goldfeder, Claudio Orlandi, Sebastian Ra-
macher, Christian Rechberger. Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge and Signatures
from Symmetric-Key Primitives* [Cha+17].
• Dennis Hofheinz, Kathrin Hövelmanns, Eike Kiltz. A Modular Analysis of the
Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation [HHK17].
• Fang Song, Aaram Yun. Quantum Security of NMAC and Related Constructions
[SY17].
• Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Long Chen, Hong Wang, Zhi Ma. IND-CCA-
secure Key Encapsulation Mechanism in the Quantum Random Oracle Model,
Revisited [Jia+18].
• Sungsook Kim, Jeeun Lee, Rakyong Cho, Kwangjo Kim. Validating IGE Mode
of Block Cipher from Quantum Adversaries [KLCK18].
• Alan Szepieniec, Reza Reyhanitabar, Bart Preneel. Key Encapsulation from Noisy
Key Agreement in the Quantum Random Oracle Model [SRP18].
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• Tsunekazu Saito, Keita Xagawa, Takashi Yamakawa. Tightly-Secure Key-Encapsulation
Mechanism in the Quantum Random Oracle Model [SXY18].
• Anne Broadbent, Sebastien Lord. Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Random
Oracles [BL19].
• Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Zhi Ma. Tighter security proofs for generic key
encapsulation mechanism in the quantum random oracle model [JZM19b].
These are the results that are public and that we are aware of. We do not claim,
that this list is complete. Since the release of the improved O2H Theorem, which uses
semi-classical oracles [AHU19], some authors have already used this new version:
• Kathrin Hövelmanns, Eike Kiltz, Sven Schäge, Dominique Unruh. Generic Au-
thenticated Key Exchange in the Quantum Random Oracle Model [HKSU18].
• Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Zhi Ma. Key Encapsulation Mechanism with
Explicit Rejection in the Quantum Random Oracle Model [JZM19a]
• Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang, Zhi Ma. Tighter security proofs for generic key
encapsulation mechanism in the quantum random oracle model [JZM19b].
In Quantum security proofs using semi-classical oracles [AHU19], the authors
also improved the security proof from Quantum Security of the Fujisaki-Okamoto and
OAEP Transforms [TU16].
The comparison of the old and new bounds is summarized in Figure 4. Since it
is difficult to compare the various formulas, in the column ”queries“, we summarize
the relationship between the number of queries and attack probability: Say ε is the
advantage against the underlying public-key encryption scheme. We assume that the
terms that involve ε dominate all other terms and find how many queries does one have
to make to break the scheme (with constant probability). Take the advantage qε1/2 for
example. We need q ≈ ε−1/2 queries for a successful attack, so we get q2 ≈ 1/ε queries.
The bounds for the first three papers ([TU16], [HKSU18] and [JZM19a]) were
given by Ambainis, Hamburg and Unruh [AHU19]. There is a small difference in
the bound for Jiang-Zhang-Ma, new O2H, IND-CPA: the second and third summands
q2−n/2 + q
2n′ were omitted by accident in [AHU19]. But to be consistent with the other
bounds, we included it here.
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Setting Security Bound Queries
Targhi-Unruh [TU16]
old O2H, OW-CPA IND-CCA εsym + q9/52−γ/5 + q3/2ε1/4 + q3/22−n1/4 q6 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, IND-CPA IND-CCA εsym + q9/52−γ/5 + qq
1/2
dec ε
1/2 + q3/2qdec2
−n/2 q2qdec ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, OW-CPA IND-CCA εsym + q9/52−γ/5 + q3/2qdecε1/2 q3q2dec ≈ 1/ε
Hövelmanns-Kiltz-Schäge-Unruh [HKSU18]
old O2H, IND-CPA IND-CCA qε1/2 + q2−n/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, IND-CPA IND-CCA q1/2ε1/2 + q2−n/2 q ≈ 1/ε
Jiang-Zhang-Ma [JZM19a]
old O2H, OW-CPA IND-CCA qε1/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, OW-CPA IND-CCA qε1/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, IND-CPA IND-CCA q1/2ε1/2 + q2−n/2 + q2−n
′
q ≈ 1/ε
Hofheinz-Hövelmanns-Kiltz [HHK17]
old O2H, OW-CPA OW-PCA qε1/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, OW-CPA OW-PCA qε1/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, IND-CPA OW-PCA q1/2ε1/2 + q2−n/2 q ≈ 1/ε
old O2H, OW-PCA IND-CCA qε1/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, OW-PCA IND-CCA qε1/2 q2 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, IND-PCA IND-CCA q1/2ε1/2 + q2−n/2 q ≈ 1/ε
old O2H, OW-CPA IND-CCA q3/2ε1/4 q6 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, OW-CPA IND-CCA q3/2ε1/4 q6 ≈ 1/ε
new O2H, IND-CPA IND-CCA q5/4ε1/4 + q3/22−n/4 q5 ≈ 1/ε
The ”setting“ column says whether the proof uses the old or the new O2H Theorem and
which security of the underlying public-key encryption scheme was used.
The ”bound“ column gives the bound on the advantage of the adversary against the
security in ”security“ column, up to constant factor. In [TU16] a hybrid public-key
encryption scheme is constructed, in the other cases for IND-CCA security, a KEM.
If the security is OW-PCA [HHK17], the resulting scheme is a public-key encryption
scheme. ε is the advantage of the reduced adversary against the one-wayness or IND-
CPA security of the underlying public-key scheme. εsym is the advantage against the
underlying symmetric encryption scheme. q is the number of queries (random oracle
and decryption queries), but qdec only the decryption queries. γ is the min-entropy of
ciphertexts and n is the length of the plaintext of the underlying public-key scheme. n′
is the length of an additional hash appended to the ciphertext in [JZM19a].
The column ”queries“ summarizes the relationship between the number of queries and
attack probability. Here, we treat all advantages (ε, εsym) as the same.
For simplicity, all the bounds are given for the case that no decryption errors occur.
Figure 4: Security bounds of different Fujisaki-Okamoto variants using the old and the
new O2H Theorems.
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We added the bounds for A Modular Analysis of the Fujisaki-Okamoto Trans-
formation [HHK17] to this Figure. Note that for the lines with ”Setting“ in bold, the
security proof from [HHK17] was modified by us (see Section 4) so that it uses the
improved version of the O2H Theorem. In Section 4 we consider adversaries that might
execute parallel oracle invocations and therefore we differentiate between query depth d
and query number q. In Figure 4 we use the upper bound q ≥ d to make the comparison
between different papers easier.
Since the original analysis was modular (OW-CPA secure PKE was turned into
and IND-CCA secure KEM in two steps), we decided to include transformations from
OW-CPA to OW-PCA and from OW-PCA to IND-CCA separately. This allows us to
see the improvement in bounds on each transformation. We also combined these two
transformations to get the same setting that the other three papers had (that is from
OW-CPA to IND-CCA).
The security proofs were restated under the assumption that the underlying public-
key encryption scheme is one-way and that it is IND-CPA (or IND-PCA) secure. No
matter which of the assumptions is used, the resulting bounds are essentially the same
in the original proof. However, the resulting bounds are much better when we used
IND-CPA (or IND-PCA) security with the new O2H Theorem.
From Figure 4 we can see that the bounds are essentially the same with the old
and the new O2H if we use the same security assumption. But if we used IND-CPA (or
IND-PCA), the dependence on the query number changed from square to linear. After
combining transformations IND-CPA to OW-PCA and from OW-PCA to IND-CCA , the
dependence on the query number changed from the sixth power to fifth.
The improvement would be even greater if we could use both transformations
from IND-CPA to OW-PCA and from IND-PCA to IND-CCA. But that requires an addi-
tional transformation in the middle: from OW-PCA to IND-PCA. With a tight transfor-
mation from OW-PCA to IND-PCA, we could combine the bounds for transformations
from IND-CPA to OW-PCA and from IND-PCA to IND-CCA. The resulting scheme
would have q3/4ε1/4+q2−n/4 in the ”Bound“ column and q3 ≈ 1/ε in the ”Queries“ col-
umn. This means that the the dependence on the query number would change from the
sixth power to cubic. This result would be similar to the improvement on Targhi-Unruh
[TU16]. We view it as an open problem to find such transformation from OW-PCA to
IND-PCA, because this could significantly improve the bound.
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4 Transformations
In this section we use semi-classical oracles to improve on security proofs that used
O2H Theorem from [Unr15b]. To make comparison between the old and new proof
easier, we use the same notation and reproduce text verbatim (in the parts where the
proof does not change). The parts of the proofs that we changed have a shaded box
around them (this does not include minor changes like a change in the game number).
4.1 T: from OW-CPA to OW-PCA security in the QROM
T transforms an OW-CPA secure public-key encryption scheme into an OW-PCA secure
one [HHK17].
EncG1 (pk,m)
1 c := Enc(pk,m;G(m))
2 return c
DecG1 (sk, c)
3 m′ := Dec(sk, c)
4 if m′ = ⊥ or Enc(pk,m′;G(m′)) 6= c
5 return ⊥
6 else return m′
Figure 5: OW-PCA-secure encryption scheme PKE1 = T[PKE,G]. We write G to em-
phasize that Enc1 and Dec1 use the oracle G.
Take PKE1 = T[PKE,G], where the public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec)
has message spaceM, randomness space R and a random oracle G : M → R. The
algorithms of PKE1 = (Gen,EncG1 , Dec
G
1 ) are defined in Figure 5. Note that the result-
ing encryption is deterministic (it produces the same ciphertext for a given message and
public key).
The following theorem establishes that OW-PCA security of PKE1 reduces to the
OW-CPA security of PKE in the QROM. We first state a lemma that is used in the proof.
Lemma 4.1 (from [HHK17]). Assume PKE to be δ-correct. Then PKE1 = T[PKE,G]
is δ1-correct in the quantum random oracle model, where δ1 = δ1(qG) ≤ 8 · (qG+1)2 ·δ.
The proof of this lemma can be found in [HHK17].
Theorem 4.1 (PKE OW-CPA (IND-CPA) QROM−−−→ PKE1 OW-PCA). Assume PKE to be
δ-correct. Then, for any OW-PCA quantum adversary B that issues at most qG queries
to the quantum random oracle G with query depth dG and qP (classical) queries to a
plaintext checking oracle Pco with query depth dP,
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(a) there exist OW-CPA quantum adversaries C and E such that
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (C)
+ (4dG + 4dP + 4) ·
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (E).
and the running time of B is about that of C and E.
(b) there exist IND-CPA quantum adversaries G and F such that
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (G) +
1
|M|
+ (2
√
dG + dP + 1) ·
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ) +
4(dG + dP)
|M| .
and the running time of B is about that of G and F .
The original bound from [HHK17] is
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 + (1 + 2qG) ·
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (A).
Note that Theorem 4.1 distinguishes query depth dG and query number qG while
the original theorem from [HHK17] only used query number qG. This change is intro-
duced because [AHU19] considers adversaries that might execute parallel oracle invo-
cations. For comparison, we also give the bound for qG in the end of the proof.
In the original proof [HHK17], the random oracle was modeled as a 2qG-wise
independent hash function. Zhandry [Zha12] proved that no quantum algorithm Af ,
issuing at most q quantum queries to f , can distinguish between a random function f
and a 2q-wise independent function. We assume that simulating random oracles takes
unit cost and that random oracle is just a random function as common in literature. This
ensures that the running time of B is about that of C and D.
Proof. Let B be an adversary against the OW-PCA security of PKE1, issuing at most qG
queries to G with query depth dG and at most qP queries to Pco with query depth qP. We
write PcoG to emphasize that the random oracle used for randomness in the encryption
is G. Consider the games given in Figure 6.
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GAME G0-G3
1 (pk, sk)← Gen
2 m∗ $←−M
3 G
$←− (M→R)
4 r∗ := G(m∗) G0-G1
5 r∗ $←− R G2-G3
6 c∗ := Enc(pk,m∗; r∗)
7 m′ ← BG,PcoG (pk, c∗) G0, G1, G3
8 H := G(m∗ := r∗) G2
9 m′ ← BH,PcoH (pk, c∗) G2
10 return Jm′ = m∗K
PcoG(m ∈M, c)
11 m′ := Dec(sk, c) G0
12 return Jm′ = m ∧ Enc(pk,m′;G(m′)) = cK G0
13 return JEnc(pk,m;G(m)) = cK G1-G5
GAME G4, G5
14 FIND := false
15 (pk, sk)← Gen
16 m∗ $←−M
17 G
$←− (M→R)
18 r∗ $←− R
19 c∗ := Enc(pk,m∗; r∗) G4
20 c∗ := Enc(pk, 0; r∗) G5
21 BG\{m
∗},PcoG\{m∗} (pk, c∗)
22 return FIND
G \ {m∗}|ψ, φ〉
23 |ψ′, b〉 := OSC{m∗}|ψ, 0〉
24 if b = 1
25 FIND := true
26 return G|ψ′, φ〉
Figure 6: Games G0-G5 for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
GAME G0. Since game G0 is the original OW-PCA game for PKE1,
Pr[GB0 ⇒ 1] = AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B).
GAME G1. In game G1 the plaintext checking oracle PcoG is replaced with a
simulation that does not make use of the secret key anymore. We claim
|Pr[GB1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB0 ⇒ 1]| ≤ 8 · (qG + 1)2 · δ. (10)
To show Equation (10), first note that both GameG0 and GameG1 proceed identi-
cally until the event thatB submits aPcoG query (m, c) such that c = Enc(pk,m;G(m))
andDec(sk, c) 6= m. We call this event BADR. Since both GameG0 and GameG1 pro-
ceed identically conditioned on the event that BADR does not happen,
|Pr[GB1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB0 ⇒ 1]| ≤ Pr[BADR].
One can show that there exists an adversary F against COR-QRO that perfectly
simulates games G0 and G1 and wins iff BADR happens. COR-QRO is defined in
Figure 1. Applying Lemma 4.1, we see that
Pr[BADR] ≤ Pr[COR-QROF ] ≤ 8 · (qG + 1)2 · δ.
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GAME G2. In game G2, replace oracle access to G with oracle access to H in
line 9. H is defined as follows: pick a uniformly random r∗ in line 5, let H(m) :=
G(m) for all m 6= m∗ and let H(m∗) = r∗. Since G is uniformly random, replacing it
everywhere with H := G(m∗ := r∗) does not change the distribution. Replacing G(m∗)
by r∗ does not change the game either because r∗ is the output of G(m∗). We have
shown that
Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GB1 ⇒ 1].
BˆH(pk, c∗,m∗)
1 m′ ← BH,PcoH(pk, c∗)
2 return Jm′ = m∗K
Figure 7: Adversary Bˆ for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
GAME G3. In game G3, we switch back to oracle access to G from H. Define
BˆH(pk, c∗,m∗) as in Figure 7. Note that Bˆ simulates Pco itself. For z := (pk, c∗ :=
Enc(pk,m∗; r∗),m∗) and S := {m∗}, where (pk, sk)← Gen , m∗ $←−M and r∗ $←− R,
we can write:
Pleft := Pr[b = 1 : b← BˆH(z)] = Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1]
Pright := Pr[b = 1 : b← BˆG(z)] = Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1]
Pfind := Pr[Find : Bˆ
G\S(z)] = Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1]
From the O2H Theorem (3.2) with A := Bˆ we get
|Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1]| ≤ 2 ·
√
(dG + dP + 1) · Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1].
Now that r∗ is uniformly random and not used anywhere except as the randomness
for Enc in line 6 we trivially construct an adversary C in Figure 8 against the OW-CPA
security of the original encryption scheme PKE simulating game G3 for B that outputs
m′ = m∗ if B wins in game G3.
Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1] = AdvOW-CPAPKE (C).
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C(pk, c∗)
1 G
$←− (M→R)
2 m′ ← BG,PcoG(pk, c∗)
3 return m′
DO
SC
(pk, c∗)
4 G
$←− (M→R)
5 m′ ← BOSC◦G,PcoOSC◦G(pk, c∗)
6 return m′
Figure 8: Adversaries C (left) and D (right) for the proof of Theorem 4.1.
In the original proof, an adversary D was constructed trivially against the OW-CPA se-
curity of PKE simulating game G4. In our case, this is not possible, because in game
G4, the adversary has access to the oracle G \ {m∗} which might leak some information
about m∗. We give two different proofs that eliminate this problem. The first proof as-
sumes OW-CPA security of PKE (like in the original theorem statement) and the second
proof assumes IND-CPA security of PKE.
(a) Proof using OW-CPA
Note that an oracle query to G \ {m∗} is equivalent to querying G and OSC{m∗} consec-
utively. Thus, we can define an adversary DOSC (pk, c∗) (see Figure 8) that simulates
game G4, using OSC{m∗} to simulate the queries to the punctured oracles, and c∗ as the
ciphertext Enc(pk,m∗; r∗) where (pk, sk)← Gen, m∗ $←−M and r∗ $←− R. The oracle
G is chosen by D. By writing OSC{m∗} ◦G we mean querying G andOSC{m∗} consecutively.
Then
Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1] = Pr[Find : DO
SC
{m∗}(pk, c∗)]
where c∗ := Enc(pk,m∗; r∗) and m∗ is uniform. By Theorem 3.3 (with A := D,
B := E, S = {m∗}, z := (pk, c∗) and d := dG + dP)
Pr[Find : DO
SC
{m∗}(pk, c∗)] ≤ 4(dG + dP) · Pr[m∗ = E(pk, c∗)].
Here E is the adversary that stops D at a random query as in Theorem 3.3. The
runtime of E is approximately the same as that of D. Then from the OW-CPA security
of the original encryption scheme, we have
Pr[m∗ = E(pk, c∗)] ≤ AdvOW-CPAPKE (E)
and thus
Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1] ≤ 4(dG + dP) · AdvOW-CPAPKE (E).
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Collecting the probabilities gives us
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (C)
+ (2
√
dG + dP · 2
√
dG + dP + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (E)
and further simplifying proves the theorem:
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (C)
+ (4dG + 4dP + 4) ·
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (E).
(b) Proof using IND-CPA
Since r∗ is uniformly random and not used anywhere except as the randomness forEnc,
IND-CPA security implies thatEnc(pk,m∗; r∗) is indistinguishable fromEnc(pk, 0; r∗).
If gameG5 is obtained from gameG4 by replacingEnc(pk,m∗; r∗) withEnc(pk, 0; r∗)
on line 19 (see Figure 6), we have
|Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB5 ⇒ 1]| ≤ AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ).
F is defined as adversary against the IND-CPA security of PKE.
Note that an oracle query to G \ {m∗} is equivalent to querying G and OSC{m∗}
consecutively. Thus, we can define an adversary DO
SC
{m∗}(pk, c∗) (see Figure 8) that
simulates game G5, using OSC{m∗} to simulate the queries to the punctured oracles, and
c∗ as the ciphertext Enc(pk, 0; r∗) where (pk, sk) ← Gen and r∗ $←− R. The oracle G
is chosen by D. By writing OSC{m∗} ◦ G we mean querying G and OSC{m∗} consecutively.
Then
Pr[GB5 ⇒ 1] = Pr[Find : DO
SC
{m∗}(pk, c∗)]
where c∗ := Enc(pk, 0; r∗). By Corollary 3.1 (with A := D, S = {m∗}, z := (pk, c∗)
and d := dG + dP)
Pr[Find : DO
SC
{m∗}(pk, c∗)] ≤ 4(dG + dP)|M|
and thus
Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ) +
4(dG + dP)
|M| .
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Collecting the probabilities proves the theorem:
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (C)
+ (2
√
dG + dP + 1) ·
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ) +
4(dG + dP)
|M| .
It is well known that IND-CPA security of PKE (with sufficiently large message
space) implies its OW-CPA security (see Lemma 2.1). This allows us to simplify the
last bound:
Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1] = AdvOW-CPAPKE (C) ≤ AdvIND-CPAPKE (G) +
1
|M|
≤
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (G) +
1
|M|
and thus
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (G) +
1
|M|
+ (2
√
dG + dP + 1) ·
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ) +
4(dG + dP)
|M| .
Results
Since the number of queries qG, qP is always larger or equal to the query depth dG, dP
we get the following two bounds:
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (C)
+ (4qG + 4qP + 4) ·
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (E).
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (B) ≤ 8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 +
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (G) +
1
|M|
+ (2
√
qG + qP + 1) ·
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ) +
4(qG + qP)
|M| .
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4.2 QU⊥m: from OW-PCA to IND-CCA security in the QROM
QU⊥m transforms an OW-PCA secure public-key encryption scheme into an IND-CCA
secure key encapsulation mechanism with explicit rejection [HHK17]. Explicit rejection
(noted by ⊥ in QU⊥m ) means that decapsulation of an invalid ciphertext results in the
rejection symbol ⊥.
QEncH,H
′
m (pk)
1 m
$←−M
2 c← Enc1(pk,m)
3 d := H′(m)
4 K := H(m)
5 return (K, (c, d))
QDec⊥H,H
′
m (sk, (c, d))
6 m′ := Dec1(sk, c)
7 if m′ = ⊥ or H′(m′) 6= d
8 return ⊥
9 else return K := H(m′)
Figure 9: IND-CCA-secure key encapsulation mechanism QKEM⊥m =
QU⊥m[PKE1,H,H
′]. We write H,H′ to emphasize that QEnc and QDec use the
oracles H and H′.
Take QKEM⊥m = QU
⊥
m[PKE1,H,H
′], where public-key encryption scheme PKE1 =
(Gen1, Enc
H
1 , Dec
H
1 ) (see Figure 5) has message space M = {0, 1}n, and random
oracles H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n and H′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n . The algorithms of
QKEM⊥m = (Gen1,QEncm,QDec
⊥
m) are defined in Figure 9.
The following theorem establishes that IND-CCA security of QKEM⊥m reduces to
the OW-PCA security of PKE1 in the QROM.
Theorem 4.2 (PKE1 OW-PCA (IND-PCA)
QROM−−−→ QKEM⊥m IND-CCA). If PKE1 is δ1-
correct, then so is QKEM⊥m. For any IND-CCA quantum adversaryB that issues at most
qD (classical) queries to the decapsulation oracle QDec⊥m with query depth dD, at most
qH queries to the quantum random oracle H with query depth dH and at most qH′ queries
to the quantum random oracle H′ with query depth dH′ ,
(a) there exist OW-PCA quantum adversariesE0,E1 issuing 2qDqH′ queries to oracle
Pco such that
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ 2(dH′ + dH + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0)
+ 2(dH′ + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1).
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(b) there exists an IND-PCA quantum adversary A issuing 2qDqH′ queries to oracle
Pco such that
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ 2
√
dH′ + dH + dD + 1 ·
√
AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dH + dD + 1)√
n
.
The original bound from [HHK17] is
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ (2qH′ + qH) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (A).
Proof. LetB be an adversary against the IND-CCA security of QKEM⊥m, issuing at most
qD queries to QDec⊥m with query depth dD, at most qH queries to H with query depth
dH and at most qH′ queries to H′ with query dept dH′ . Consider the games given in
Figure 10.
In the original proof in [HHK17], the games were given using double indices, for
example game G1,0. We use a single index for games to be consistent with the previous
proof. For reference, games that had 0 as the second index in [HHK17] are now games
with odd indices and games that had 1 as the second index now have even indices.
In the original proof [HHK17], the random oracle was modeled as a 2qG-wise
independent hash function. We assume that simulating random oracles takes unit cost
and that the random oracle is just a random function as common in literature, unless
stated otherwise.
In the proof we use the following notion for random oracles: G × G′ : x 7→
(G(x),G′(x)).
GAMES G0, G1. Games G0 and G1 describe the IND-CCA game in its equivalent
”left-or-right“ style:
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) =
1
2
· ∣∣Pr [IND-CCAB ⇒ 0|b = 0]− Pr [IND-CCAB ⇒ 1|b = 1]∣∣
=
1
2
· ∣∣Pr [GB0 ⇒ 1]− Pr [GB1 ⇒ 1]∣∣
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GAMES G0-G5,
1 (pk, sk)← Gen1
2 H
$←− ({0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n)
3 H′ $←− ({0, 1}n → {0, 1}n)
4 m∗ $←− {0, 1}n; c∗ ← Enc1(pk,m∗)
5 K∗ := H(m∗) G0
6 K∗ $←− {0, 1}n G1-G5
7 d∗ := H′(m∗) G0, G1
8 d∗ $←− {0, 1}n G2-G5
9 b′ ← BQDec⊥H,H
′
m ,H×H′ (pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) G0, G1
10 G := H(m∗ := K∗) G2
11 G′ := H′(m∗ := d∗) G2, G3
12 b′ ← BQDec⊥G,G
′
m ,G×G′ (pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) G2
13 b′ ← BQDec⊥H,G
′
m ,H×G′ (pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) G3
14 b′ ← BQDec⊥H,H
′
m ,H×H′ (pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) G4, G5
15 return b′
QDec⊥H,H
′
m ((c, d) 6= (c∗, d∗)) G0-G7
16 m′ := Dec1(sk, c)
17 if m′ 6= ⊥ and H′(m′) = d
18 return K := H(m′)
19 else return ⊥
(H× H′) \ {m∗}|ψ, φ〉
20 |ψ′, b〉 := OSC{m∗}|ψ, 0〉
21 if b = 1
22 FIND := true
23 return (H× H′)|ψ′, φ〉
GAMES G6-G10
24 FIND := false
25 (pk, sk)← Gen1
26 H
$←− ({0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n)
27 H′ $←− ({0, 1}n → {0, 1}n) G6, G7
28 H′ = H′(X) $←− polynomial of degree
≤ 2(qH + qH′ + qD) over F2n G8-G10
29 m∗ $←− {0, 1}n; c∗ ← Enc1(pk,m∗) G6-G9
30 m∗ $←− {0, 1}n; c∗ ← Enc1(pk, 0) G10
31 K∗ $←− {0, 1}n
32 d∗ $←− {0, 1}n
33 BQDec
⊥H\{m∗},H′\{m∗}
m ,(H×H′)\{m∗}
(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) G6, G8
34 BQDec
⊥H,H′\{m∗}
m ,H×(H′\{m∗})
(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) G7, G9, G10
35 return FIND
QDec⊥H,H
′
m ((c, d) 6= (c∗, d∗)) G8-G10
36 if ∃m ∈ Roots(H′(X)− d) s.t.
Dec1(sk, c) = m
37 return K := H(m)
38 else return ⊥
H′ \ {m∗}|ψ, φ〉
39 |ψ′, b〉 := OSC{m∗}|ψ, 0〉
40 if b = 1
41 FIND := true
42 return H′|ψ′, φ〉
Figure 10: Games G0 - G10 for the proof of Theorem 4.2
GAME G2. In game G2, starting from game G0 replace oracle access to H with
oracle access to G and H′ with oracle access to G′ in line 12. G is defined as follows:
pick a uniformly random K∗ in line 6, let G(m) := H(m) for all m 6= m∗ and let
G(m∗) = K∗. G′ is defined as follows: pick a uniformly random d∗ in line 8, let
G′(m) := H′(m) for all m 6= m∗ and let G′(m∗) = d∗. Since H and H′ are uniformly
random, replacing them everywhere with G := H(m∗ := K∗) and G′ := H′(m∗ := d∗)
does not change the distribution. Replacing H(m∗) by K∗ and H′(m∗) by d∗ does not
change the game either because K∗ is the output of H(m∗) and d∗ is the output of
H′(m∗). We have shown that
Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GB0 ⇒ 1].
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GAME G3. In game G3, starting from game G1 replace oracle access to H′ with
oracle access to G′ in line 13. G′ is defined as follows: pick a uniformly random d∗
in line 8, let G′(m) := H′(m) for all m 6= m∗ and let G′(m∗) = d∗. Since H′ is
uniformly random, replacing it everywhere with G′ := H′(m∗ := d∗) does not change
the distribution. Replacing H′(m∗) by d∗ does not change the game either because d∗ is
the output of H′(m∗). We have shown that
Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GB1 ⇒ 1].
BˆG×G
′
(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗)
1 b′ ← BQDec⊥G,G′m ,G×G′(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗)
2 return b′
CˆG
′
(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗,H)
3 b′ ← BQDec⊥H,G′m ,H×G′(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗)
4 return b′
Figure 11: Adversaries Bˆ and Cˆ for the proof of Theorem 4.2
GAME G4. In game G4, starting from game G2 we switch back to oracle access
to H from G and H′ from G′. Define BˆG×G′(pk, (c∗, d∗), K∗) as in Figure 11. For S :=
{m∗} and z := (pk, (c∗ = Enc1(pk,m∗), d∗), K∗), where (pk, sk) ← Gen1, m∗ $←−
{0, 1}n, d∗ $←− {0, 1}n and K∗ $←− {0, 1}n, we can write
Pleft := Pr[b = 1 : b← BˆG×G′(z)] = Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1]
Pright := Pr[b = 1 : b← BˆH×H′(z)] = Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1]
Pfind := Pr[Find : Bˆ
H×H′\S(z)] = Pr[GB6 ⇒ 1]
From the O2H Theorem (3.2) with H := G×G′, G := H×H′ and A := Bˆ we get∣∣Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1]∣∣ ≤ 2 ·√(dH′ + dH + dD + 1) · Pr[GB6 ⇒ 1].
GAME G5. In game G5, starting from game G3 we switch back to oracle access
to H′ from G′ . Define CˆG′(pk, (c∗, d∗), K∗,H) as in Figure 11. For S := {m∗} and
z := (pk, (c∗ = Enc1(pk,m∗), d∗), K∗,H), where (pk, sk) ← Gen1, m∗ $←− {0, 1}n,
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d∗ $←− {0, 1}n and K∗ $←− {0, 1}n, we can write
Pleft := Pr[b = 1 : b← CˆG′(z)] = Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1]
Pright := Pr[b = 1 : b← CˆH′(z)] = Pr[GB5 ⇒ 1]
Pfind := Pr[Find : Cˆ
H′\S(z)] = Pr[GB7 ⇒ 1]
Note that H in z is used for queries to QDec⊥m and for queries to the random oracle
H. All other random oracle queries are for the oracle that the game is given access to
(G′ in game G2 and H′ in games G4 and G6).
From the O2H Theorem (3.2) with H := G′, G := H′ and A := Cˆ we get∣∣Pr[GB5 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1]∣∣ ≤ 2 ·√(dH′ + dD + 1) · Pr[GB7 ⇒ 1].
Since G4 = G5, we obtain:
∣∣Pr[GB0 ⇒ 1] − Pr[GB1 ⇒ 1]∣∣
≤ ∣∣Pr[GB0 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1]∣∣+ ∣∣Pr[GB1 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB5 ⇒ 1]∣∣
≤ ∣∣Pr[GB2 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB4 ⇒ 1]∣∣+ ∣∣Pr[GB3 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB5 ⇒ 1]∣∣ .
GAMES G8, G9. In games G8, G9 the random oracle H′ is replaced with a random
polynomial of degree 2(qH + qH′ + qD) over F2n . By Zhandry [Zha12] this polynomial
is indistinguishable from a random function, so this change is only conceptual and does
not change success probabilities.
The second change in games G8, G9 is that the oracle QDec⊥m does not make
use of the secret key any longer (except for line 36 by testing if Dec1(sk, c) = m for
given c and messages m). Recall that H′ = H(X) is a random polynomial of degree
≤ 2(qH + qH′ + qD) over F2n . Therefore, given that (c, d) is a valid encapsulation (i.e.,
m′ ∈M and d = H′(m′), form′ := Dec1(sk, c)), m′ lies within the roots of H′(X)−d.
In order to show that QDec⊥m returns the same output in gamesG6 andG8 (and in games
G7, G9) for every query (c, d) 6= (c∗, d∗), consider the following cases, where we define
m′ := Dec1(sk, c).
• Case 1. QDec⊥m(c, d) returns⊥ in gamesG8, G9, meaning thatm′ /∈ Roots(H′(X)−
d). That latter happens iff H′(m′) 6= d or m′ = ⊥, which is exactly the condition
QDec⊥m(c, d) returns ⊥ in games G6, G7.
• Case 2. QDec⊥m(c, d) does not return ⊥ in games G8, G9, meaning that m′ ∈
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Roots(H′(X)−d) andDec1(sk, c) = m′. Consequently, H′(m′) = d andQDec⊥m(c, d)
returns K = H(m′) in games G8, G9. That latter is again exactly the condition
QDec⊥m(c, d) returns K = H(m
′) in games G6, G7.
It is easy to verify that the equivalence ofQDec⊥m in the games follows by negation
and combining both cases. We have just shown
Pr[GB6 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GB8 ⇒ 1],
Pr[GB7 ⇒ 1] = Pr[GB9 ⇒ 1].
A
OSC{m∗},Pco
b (pk, c
∗)
1 d∗ $←− {0, 1}n; K∗ $←− {0, 1}n
2 H
$←− ({0, 1}n → {0, 1}n)
3 H′ = H′(X) $←− polynomial of degree ≤ 2(qH + qH′ + qD) over F2n
4 m′ ← BQDec
⊥OSC{m∗}◦H,O
SC
{m∗}◦H
′
m ,OSC{m∗}◦(H×H′)(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) b = 0
5 m′ ← BQDec
⊥H,OSC{m∗}◦H
′
m ,H×(OSC{m∗}◦H′)(pk, (c∗, d∗),K∗) b = 1
6 return m′
Figure 12: Adversaries Ab against OW-PCA for the proof of Theorem 4.2. Oracle
QDec⊥m(c, d) is defined as in games G8, G9 of Figure 10. Note that the oracle QDec
⊥
m
uses sk in line 36 for decrypting c, but Ab does not have access to sk. This problem
can be solved by using the plaintext checking oracle, because Pco(m, c) returns 1 if and
only if Dec1(sk, c) = m.
In the original proof, the adversaries Ab were constructed trivially against the OW-
PCA security of PKE1 simulating games G8 and G9. In our case, this is not possible,
because in game G8, G9, the adversary has access to the oracle (H × H′) \ {m∗} or
H′ \ {m∗} which might leak some information about m∗. We give two different proofs
that eliminate this problem. The first proof assumes OW-PCA security of PKE1 (like
in the original theorem statement) and the second proof assumes IND-PCA security of
PKE1. The proofs are almost identical for games G8 and G9, so we only give the proof
for game G9 (that is the proof for adversary A1).
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(a) Proof using OW-PCA
Note that an oracle query to H′ \ {m∗} is equivalent to querying H′ and OSC{m∗} con-
secutively. Thus, we can define an adversary A
OSC{m∗},Pco
1 (pk, c
∗) (see Figure 12) that
simulates game G9, usingOSC{m∗} to simulate the queries to the punctured oracles, and c∗
as the ciphertext Enc1(pk,m∗) where (pk, sk) ← Gen and m∗ $←− {0, 1}n. By writing
OSC{m∗} ◦ H′ we mean querying H′ and OSC{m∗} consecutively. Then
Pr[GB9 ⇒ 1] = Pr[Find : A
OSC{m∗}
1 (pk, c
∗)]
where c∗ := Enc1(pk,m∗) and m∗ is uniform. By Theorem 3.3 (with A := A1, B :=
E1, S = {m∗}, z := (pk, c∗) and d := dH′ + dD)
Pr[Find : A
OSC{m∗}
1 (pk, c
∗)] ≤ 4(dH′ + dD) · Pr[m∗ = E1(pk, c∗)].
Here E1 is the adversary that stops A1 at a random query as in Theorem 3.3. The
runtime ofE1 is approximately the same as that ofA1. Then from the OW-PCA security
of the original encryption scheme, we have
Pr[m∗ = E1(pk, c∗)] ≤ AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1)
and thus
Pr[GB9 ⇒ 1] ≤ 4(dH′ + dD) · AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1).
Analogously, we get
Pr[GB8 ⇒ 1] ≤ 4(dH + dH′ + dD) · AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0),
because d := dH + dH′ + dD if we use the O2H Theorem 3.3 in the A0 case.
Collecting the probabilities gives us
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤
√
dH′ + dH + dD + 1 ·
√
4(dH + dH′ + dD)AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0)
+
√
dH′ + dD + 1 ·
√
4(dH′ + dD)AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1)
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and further simplifying proves the theorem:
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ 2(dH′ + dH + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0)
+ 2(dH′ + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1).
(b) Proof using IND-PCA
IND-PCA security implies that Enc1(pk,m∗) is indistinguishable from Enc1(pk, 0). If
game G10 is obtained from game G9 by replacing Enc1(pk,m∗) with Enc1(pk, 0) on
line 30, we have ∣∣Pr[GB9 ⇒ 1]− Pr[GB10 ⇒ 1]∣∣ ≤ AdvIND-PCAPKE (A).
A is defined as adversary against the IND-PCA security of PKE1.
Note that an oracle query to H′ \ {m∗} is equivalent to querying H′ and OSC{m∗}
consecutively. Thus, we can define an adversary AO
SC ,Pco
1 (pk, c
∗) (see Figure 12) that
simulates game G10, using OSC{m∗} to simulate the queries to the punctured oracles, and
c∗ as the ciphertext Enc1(pk, 0) where (pk, sk) ← Gen. By writing OSC{m∗} ◦ H′ we
mean querying H′ and OSC{m∗} consecutively. Then
Pr[GB10 ⇒ 1] = Pr[Find : A
OSC{m∗},Pco
1 (pk, c
∗)]
where c∗ := Enc1(pk, 0). By Corollary 3.1 (with A := A1, S = {m∗}, z := (pk, c∗)
and d := dH′ + dD)
Pr[Find : A
OSC{m∗},Pco
1 (pk, c
∗)] ≤ 4(dH′ + dD)
n
and thus
Pr[GB9 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dD)
n
.
Analogously, we get
Pr[GB8 ⇒ 1] ≤ AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dH + dD)
n
,
because d := dH + dH′ + dD if we use the O2H Theorem 3.3 in the A0 case.
Collecting the probabilities gives us
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AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤
√
dH′ + dH + dD + 1 ·
√
AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dH + dD)
n
+
√
dH′ + dD + 1 ·
√
AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dD)
n
and further simplifying proves the theorem:
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ 2
√
dH′ + dH + dD + 1 ·
√
AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dH + dD + 1)√
n
.
Results
Since the number of queries q is always larger or equal to the query depth d, we get the
following two bounds:
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ 2(qH′ + qH + qD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0)
+ 2(qH′ + qD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1)
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤ 2
√
qH′ + qH + qD + 1 ·
√
AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(qH′ + qH + qD + 1)√
n
.
The original theorem statement from [HHK17] said that the running time of A
is about that of B. Since A computes the roots of polynomials of degree ≤ 2qH′ , it is
unlikely that the running time of A is linear to B . The same problem remains in our
proof. But, if the running time of B is polynomial, then so is A, because finding roots
of polynomials takes polynomial time [Ben81].
4.3 QU6⊥m: from OW-PCA to IND-CCA security in the QROM
QU6⊥m transforms an OW-PCA secure public-key encryption scheme into an IND-CCA
secure key encapsulation mechanism with implicit rejection [HHK17]. Implicit rejec-
tion (noted by 6⊥ in QU6⊥m) means that decapsulation of an invalid ciphertext results in a
pseudorandom key K.
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Gen 6⊥
1 (pk′, sk′)← Gen1
2 s
$←−M
3 sk := (sk′, s)
4 return (pk′, sk)
QEncH,H
′
m (pk)
5 m
$←−M
6 c← Enc1(pk,m)
7 d := H′(m)
8 K := H′(m)
9 return (K, (c, d))
QDec 6⊥H,H
′
m (sk
′ = (sk, s), (c, d))
10 m′ := Dec1(sk, c)
11 if m′ = ⊥ or H′(m′) 6= d
12 return K := H(s, (c, d))
13 else return K := H(m′)
Figure 13: IND-CCA-secure key encapsulation mechanism QKEM 6⊥m =
QU6⊥m[PKE1,H,H
′]. We write H,H′ to emphasize that QEnc and QDec use the
oracles H and H′.
Take QKEM 6⊥m = QU
6⊥
m[PKE1,H,H
′], where public-key encryption scheme PKE1 =
(Gen1, Enc1, Dec1 has message spaceM = {0, 1}n, and random oraclesH : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n andH′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. The algorithms ofQKEM 6⊥m = (Gen6⊥,QEncm,QDec6⊥m)
are defined in Figure 13.
The following theorem establishes that IND-CCA security of QKEM 6⊥m reduces to
the OW-PCA security of PKE1 in the QROM.
Theorem 4.3 (PKE1 OW-PCA (IND-PCA)
QROM−−−→ QKEM 6⊥m IND-CCA). If PKE1 is δ1-
correct, then so is QKEM 6⊥m. For any IND-CCA quantum adversaryB that issues at most
qD (classical) queries to the decapsulation oracle QDec 6⊥m with query depth dD, at most
qH queries to the quantum random oracle H with query depth dH and at most qH′ queries
to the quantum random oracle H′ with query depth dH′ ,
(a) there exist OW-PCA quantum adversariesE0,E1 issuing 2qDqH′ queries to oracle
Pco such that
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM6⊥m
(B) ≤ 2(dH′ + dH + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0)
+ 2(dH′ + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1).
(b) there exists an IND-PCA quantum adversary A issuing 2qDqH′ queries to oracle
Pco such that
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM 6⊥m
(B) ≤ 2
√
dH′ + dH + dD + 1 ·
√
AdvIND-PCAPKE1 (A) +
4(dH′ + dH + dD + 1)√
n
.
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The original bound from [HHK17] is
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM 6⊥m
(B) ≤ (2qH′ + qH) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (A).
The proof is almost the same as the proof of Theorem 4.2. The difference is that
in the proof of Theorem 4.2, the simulation of QDec always knows if a given ciphertext
is valid or not. If it is not valid, ⊥ is returned. In the proof of Theorem 4.3 one can
simply replace ⊥ by H(s, (c, d)).
4.4 The resulting KEMs
The transformations T and {QU⊥m,QU6⊥m} from previous sections can be combined to
obtain two transformations QKEM⊥m and QKEM
6⊥
m. If we have public-key encryption
scheme PKE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) with message space M and randomness space R,
and random oracles G :M → R, H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n and H′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n,
we get:
QKEM⊥m := QU
⊥
m [T[PKE,G],H,H
′] = (Gen,QEncm,QDec⊥m)
QKEM 6⊥m := QU
6⊥
m [T[PKE,G],H,H
′] = (Gen6⊥,QEncm,QDec6⊥m)
Algorithms Gen,QEnc,QDec are given if Figures 9 and 13.
Combining Theorems 4.1–4.3 gives us the concrete bounds of the IND-CCA se-
curity of these KEMs in the quantum random oracle model. dH′ , dH, dG, dP, dD are the
query depths for quantum random oracles H′,H, G, the plaintext checking oracle Pco
and the decapsulation oracle QDec⊥m, respectively. qG is the number of queries to G. To
simplify, we assume that
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (C) =
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (E) =
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (A).
We get the following bound:
AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤
≤ 2(dH′ + dH + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0) + 2(dH′ + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1)
≤ (4dH′ + 2dH + 4dD + 4) ·
√
8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 + (4dG + 4dP + 5) ·
√
AdvOW-CPAPKE (A).
Similarly, if we use a slightly stronger assumption of the IND-CPA-security of PKE and
assume that
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (G) =
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (F ) =
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (A), we get a better
bound:
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AdvIND-CCA
QKEM⊥m
(B) ≤
≤ 2(dH′ + dH + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E0) + 2(dH′ + dD + 1) ·
√
AdvOW-PCAPKE1 (E1)
≤ (4dH′ + 2dH + 4dD + 4)·√√√√8 · δ · (qG + 1)2 + (1 + 2√dG + dP + 1) ·
√
AdvIND-CPAPKE (A) +
4(dG + dP)
|M| .
The bounds for QKEM 6⊥m are the same.
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5 Conclusion
With the intention to understand the impact of semi-classical One-Way to Hiding The-
orem and to increase tightness of post-quantum secure encryption schemes, we gave on
overview of the background in quantum cryptography and recreated proofs by Hofheinz
et al. [HHK17] using semi-classical oracles. A detailed proof was given for two trans-
formations T and QU⊥m that taken together yield an IND-CCA secure KEM from an
OW-CPA secure public key encryption scheme. While the original analysis only as-
sumed one-wayness from these two transformations, we showed that if we use slightly
stronger assumption (that is IND-CPA and IND-PCA security, respectively), the tight-
ness improves considerably.
Since the two transformations that gave the biggest improvement for tightness are
incompatible (from IND-CPA to OW-PCA and IND-PCA to IND-CCA ), we view it as
an open problem to find such transformation from OW-PCA to IND-PCA to possibly
achieve even better bounds.
We also gave a list of papers that use the old version of the One-Way to Hiding
Theorem. A similar analysis of recreating the security proofs with the improved version
of the O2H Theorem could be carried out for all of these to improve the security bounds
and possibly end up with tighter post-quantum secure encryption schemes.
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